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Piercing China's Corporate Veil:
Open Questions from the New Company Law
In 2006, China undertook a major overhaul of its legal framework
governing corporations by implementing a new Company Law.' Much of the
previous Company Law was revised or eliminated, with many new provisions
added This development was much anticipated by Chinese and foreigners
alike, as China's previous corporate law was unable to keep pace with its fast-
growing economy.3 One of the highlights of the new Company Law is its
formal establishment of the concept of "piercing the corporate veil" in Chinese
law.
The concept of piercing the corporate veil is a longstanding feature of the
corporate law of capitalist economies. An important corporate form in such
economies is the limited liability corporation (LLC), a key attribute of which is
that shareholders are not personally liable for corporate debts in excess of their
investment in the LLC. Creditors seeldng payment of debts or tort victims
seeking redress generally can reach only the corporation's assets, not those of
its shareholders. At times, however, courts ignore this corporate fiction and
treat a corporation's debt as the debt of the corporation's shareholders. In
doing so, courts "pierce the corporate veil."
1. Gongsi fa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. i, 2006) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 20o6 P.R.C. Company Law].
2. Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China's New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and
Assessment, 19 AUSTL. J. CoRP. L. 229, 231-32 (2006) (noting that of the 229 provisions of the
1994 Company Law, 46 provisions had been deleted and 137 amended, with 41 new
provisions added).
3. For a discussion of shortcomings in the 1994 Company Law, see, for example, Gu
MINKANG, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 312-17 (2006); Nicholas C. Howson,
China's Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 127, 140-72 (1997); Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, supra note 2, at 229-31.
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The notion of piercing the corporate veil did not exist formally in Chinese
statutory law prior to 2006. The new Company Law, however, allows courts to
pierce the corporate veil under certain circumstances. In doing so, it aligns
Chinese corporate law more closely with that of other market economies.
While this change is welcome, China's new Company Law fails to address
important questions about the veil-piercing doctrine. This ambiguity
negatively affects several constituencies. Creditors lack certainty about when
they can expect to recover from a bankrupt debtor whose shareholders may
have operated illegally. Shareholders lack clear guidance about what constitutes
abuses of the corporate form against which they should monitor. Ordinary
citizens harmed by tortious acts lack clarity about when they can tap into the
deep pockets of parent corporations. Finally, foreigners who lend funds to
Chinese companies, contract with or invest in shares of Chinese subsidiaries, or
establish their own subsidiaries in China are denied a clear sense of the legal
rules at play.
This Comment highlights legal ambiguities on two fronts- how the law is
to be applied, and what its scope is. These shortcomings should be addressed
in one of two ways. Either the State Council should promulgate additional
regulations related to the new Company Law, or the Supreme People's Court
(SPC) should issue to lower courts a judicial interpretation that establishes
guidelines on how the new Company Law should be interpreted.4 Unless one
of these steps is taken, creditors, investors, and shareholders alike will face
continued uncertainty about when courts can pierce a corporate veil.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE VEIL PIERCING
Prior to 2006, China's veil-piercing doctrine operated in a state of
uncertainty. Not until the 199os, with the rise of the LLC as a corporate form
in China, did the notion of a corporate veil become important.' In 1994,
Chinese law formally recognized LLCs as "legal person[s]" with shareholder
liability limited to the extent of the shareholder's "capital contributions" or
"shareholdings. '6 However, the 1994 Company Law did not grant Chinese
4. For an overview of the Chinese legal system including the role of the SPC's judicial
interpretations and State Council regulations, see, for example, Peter Howard Come,
Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 5o AM. J. COMP. L. 369 (2O02).
S. Note, however, that the LLC as a corporate form has been available under Chinese law since
1951 for private corporations. See Chuan Roger Peng, Note, Limited Liability in China: A
Partial Reading of China's Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 263, 266 (1996).
6. Gongsi fa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994), art. 3, ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (P.RC.).
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courts the right to pierce the corporate veil. Nor did any other statute confer
such power.7 As a result, most Chinese commentators agreed that China's law
did not include piercing the corporate veil.8
Despite the absence of an express statute, some enterprising Chinese judges
implemented the concept informally during this period. For example, in
replying to an inquiry made by the High Court of Guangdong province, the
SPC implied that veil piercing may be permissible when the actual capital
contribution made to a corporation is less than the amount of capital registered
under that corporation. 9 The SPC has also affirmed a number of lower court
decisions that pierced the corporate veil.'"
These cases, however, failed to establish clearly the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil for three reasons. First, because China is governed by civil law,
cases hold no precedential value." Second, the SPC's own case law suggested a
mixed jurisprudence. The court reversed lower court decisions to pierce the
7. Note that under article 61 of the General Principles of Civil Law, any party whose juristic act
is held void because of fraud, deception, violation, or unlawful purpose is required to return
all properties it has obtained by the void act and to compensate the victim. This civil
liability, however, is limited by article 48, which stipulates that a state-owned enterprise is
liable only to the extent of the property that has been granted by the state for its operation.
Other enterprises are liable only to the extent of the property that they own. Minfa tongze
[General Principles of the Civil Law] (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987), arts. 48 & 61, ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (P.R.C.).
8. Zhang Xianchu, Piercing the Company Veil and Regulation of Companies in China, in LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY AND LAW 129, 132 (Wang Guiguo & Wei
Zhenying eds., 1996); Weiguo He, Legal Transplantation of "Piercing the Corporate Veil"
to China 8 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http ://lsa.mcgill.ca/aplam/ChineseArticles/Legal%2oTransplantationo200f%2oPiercing%2
othe%20Corporate%2oVeil%2Oto%2OChina%20%2oby%2oWeiguo%2oHe.pdf (last visited
Aug. 30, 2007) (citing JUNHAi Liu, PROTECTION FOR SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN
CORPORATIONS LIMITED BY SHARES 362 (1997)).
9. Guanyu qiye kaiban de qita qiye bei chexiao huozhe xieye hou minshi zeren chengdan wenti
de pifu (On the Assumption of Civil Liability After an Enterprise Established by Another
Enterprise Has Been Closed or Gone Out of Business] (Reply of the SPC to High Court of
Guangdong, Mar. 30, 1994) (No. 1994[4]) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Aug. 15, 2007)
(P.R-C.).
io. Zhang Xianchu, supra note 8, at 134-35 (highlighting examples of piercing cases that the SPC
affirmed).
ii. However, the Supreme People's Court can make a legal principle binding on a lower court
by issuing a judicial interpretation on a topic. Thus, under the Chinese legal system, it is
through judicial interpretations rather than precedents that the Supreme People's Court
performs statutory interpretation and enacts legal principles.
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corporate veil in cases that were factually similar to cases it affirmed.1 2 Finally,
veil piercing occurred in only selected provincial courts.'3 A uniform principle
did not exist across China.
This all changed with the 20o6 revisions to the Company Law. Article 20 of
the law states: "Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the
payment of its debts by abusing the independent status of juridical persons or
the shareholder's limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of
any creditors, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the company."' 4 In
addition, article 64 provides a veil-piercing provision relevant to single-
shareholder LLCs. It states: "If the shareholder of a one-person limited liability
company is unable to prove that the property of the one-person limited liability
company is independent from his own property, he shall bear joint liabilities
for the debts of the company."s
II. CRITIQUING CHINA'S NEW VEIL-PIERCING PROVISIONS
Because of the relative lack of public transparency surrounding China's
statutory drafting process, one can only speculate about why Chinese
lawmakers felt compelled to include veil-piercing provisions in the new
Company Law. There are at least three feasible motives. First, given China's
burgeoning economy and the rising importance of LLCs, the government may
have wanted to provide greater clarity to investors and creditors alike about
when, if ever, veil piercing might occur. In other words, it did not want legal
uncertainty to constrain the development and growth of LLCs artificially.
Second, the central government may have wanted to rein in enterprising judges
12. See Zhang Xianchu, supra note 8, at 135-37 (discussing a case in which the SPC reversed a
decision to pierce the corporate veil when the company had been undercapitalized, and a
case in which the SPC reversed a decision to pierce the corporate veil despite the parent
company's de facto control over the subsidiary).
13. See, e.g., Beijing Chengxiang Haodu Constr. Co. v. Yang Jingui, CHINALAWINFO (Beijing
High People's Ct., July 31, 2002). But see, e.g., Japan Yueliangren Zhenzhi Co. v. Nantong
Richu Fuzhuang Co., CHINALAWINFO (Nantong Interm. People's Ct., Nov. 14, 2001). The
high courts of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Ningxia provinces have pierced the corporate veil.
See Zhang Xianchu, supra note 8, at 135-37. The high court of Tianjin Municipality has also
pierced the corporate veil. See Zhu Ciyun, Bixu zunzhong he weihu gongsi de duli renge [The
Necessity of Respecting and Protecting the Corporation as an Independent Entity], in 2 ZHONGGUO
ANLI ZHIDAO: MINSHI JUAN [GuIDANcE ON CHINESE CASES: CnVL LAW] 387, 391 (2006)
(describing a case where the court found that the illegal conversion of corporate assets for
personal use justified veil piercing).
14. 2006 P.R.C. Company Law art. 20.
i5. Id. art. 64.
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and ensure greater uniformity in the doctrine's application across lower courts.
Third, the government may have wanted to strengthen the judiciary's hand in
combating corporate fraud. The National People's Congress Standing
Committee report on amending the Company Law specifically mentions the
problem of shareholders abusing the corporate form by illicitly transferring
and commingling corporate assets.' 6 Formal legal recognition of the power to
pierce the corporate veil deters against such abuse.
However, articles 20 and 64 are only partially successful in accomplishing
the goals above. While the veil-piercing provisions are a welcome addition to
Chinese law, China's nascent doctrine falls short in two areas. First, the 2006
Company Law provides insufficient guidance to courts about how to proceed
with analyzing a veil-piercing case. Second, the law's scope is unclear, or
otherwise, too narrowly constrained. These shortcomings mean that
considerable uncertainty remains for those who invest in or lend to LLCs. In
addition, the extent of the judiciary's power to pierce the corporate veil, as well
as limitations on this power, remain less than clear.
To see how such problems may arise, consider the text of the two articles
providing the court with the power to pierce the corporate veil. Article 20
directly discusses only two factors that courts should consider: (1) whether the
abuse results in debt nonrepayment; and (2) whether this nonrepayment
causes actual injury to a party.17 Article 64 raises another factor: the
commingling of assets. 8 The law is unclear about whether these are the only
factors that courts are to consider, or alternatively, whether courts may
consider additional factors when adjudicating a demand to pierce the corporate
veil.
For example, the law makes no mention of whether or not the existence of
fraud is a factor that a court may consider. Under the Anglo-American system,
fraud is not a necessary prerequisite. Plaintiffs can seek to pierce the corporate
veil even when the corporation did not seek to defraud its creditors. Some civil
law jurisdictions, including Japan and Germany, have adopted a similar
system.' 9 Under the French system, however, a plaintiff must show that a
16. Zhu Ciyun, "Ziben buzu" zai Gongsi fa renge fouren shiyong zhong de yiyi
["Undercapitalization" and the Principle of Disregarding the Corporate Entity Under the
Company Law] 1 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal),
available at http://www.fatianxia.com/paper-list.asp?id=2267o (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
17. 2006 P.R.C. Company Law art. 20.
18. Id. art. 64.
19. GERHARD WIRTH, MICHAEL ARNOLD & MARK GREENE, CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY 23-24
(2004) (stating that German courts consider factors including commingling of assets, de
facto control, grossly negligent conduct, and undercapitalization); Misao Tatsuta, A Parent
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corporation committed one of three types of fraud before courts will pierce the
corporate veil. The corporation must have knowingly engaged in unlawful
action, set out to intentionally conceal the nature of the transaction, or
deliberately engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning a company's separate
existence. 21 China's new law does not take a position on this divide. From a
textual perspective, it does not appear to require proof of fraud. Yet, do judges
have the flexibility to consider fraud as an additional factor when adjudicating?
Or are they constrained by the factors delineated in articles 2o and 64?
If the law grants judges the flexibility to consider additional factors, then
the new law is problematic because it fails to set clear boundaries on how
judges should analyze a veil-piercing case.2 ' Local judicial officials can craft
their own multifactor analyses, which raises the possibility that decisions will
reflect local protectionist interests.2 It also weakens the integrity of judicial
review, since higher-level courts can effectively decide whether to uphold or
reverse a lower court's decision on a veil-piercing case based on their own set of
arbitrary criteria designed to achieve a desired outcome.
On the other hand, if the factors listed in articles 2o and 64 are a closed set,
that would raise a different concern. The new law explicitly discusses only the
rights of creditors. Although bankruptcies are an important context in which
veil piercing is invoked, they are, by no means, the only ones. China's courts
are bound to face demands to pierce the corporate veil in noncreditor situations
in the coming years. Environmental class action lawsuits are on the rise, 23 as
China confronts major environmental problems. In addition, with increased
Corporation's Liability for Its Subsidiary's Obligations, in LAw AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 338,
340 (Yukio Yanigada et al. eds., 2000) (noting that Japanese courts consider whether the
parent company possesses effective control over the subsidiary and the position of creditors
in relation to the subsidiary). However, Japanese law does provide stronger remedies in the
instance of fraud, namely the dissolution of the fraudulent corporate entity. See SHOHo
[Commercial Code], art. 141 (Japan).
20. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 5:4 (2007).
21. Cf. Liu Jun-hai, Xin gongsi fa zhong jiekai gongsi miansha zhidu de jieshi nandian tanxi [An
Analysis of the Controversial Issues of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Context of the New
Corporate Law], 17 TONGJI U. J. Soc. ScI. SEC. 111, 115 (2006) (noting that one of the
problems with the law is its failure to provide judges with guidance on how to determine
what constitutes "abuse" under article 20).
22. For a discussion of the problems of local protectionism in the Chinese judiciary, see, for
example, XIN CHUNYING, CHINESE COURTS: HISTORY AND TRANSITION 185-214 (2004);
Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 97, 1O6-07 (2003); Pitman B. Potter, The Legal Implications of China's
Accession to the WTO, CHINA QO, Sept. 2001, at 592, 601-02.
23. Sarah Schafer, Taking China to Court, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Nov. 20, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15672o81/site/newsweek/.
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worries about product safety, Chinese consumers are likely to seek greater
enforcement of consumer protection laws. A narrow textualist interpretation of
the new Company Law suggests that the Company Law's veil-piercing
provisions may not cover all such litigants. Article 20's scope, if read literally,
applies only to debt situations. As a result, China's new veil-piercing provisions
are either too narrow or, at best, ambiguous in their applicable scope.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCING CHINA'S VEIL-PIERCING
DOCTRINE
Veil-piercing cases are highly fact specific, and some degree of judicial
flexibility is desirable. Nevertheless, Chinese corporate law would benefit from
more clearly delineating its applicable scope and the factors to be considered by
courts in a veil-piercing case.
The SPC or the State Council should clarify how courts should consider a
demand to pierce the corporate veil.' It should specify that the factors
mentioned in articles 20 and 64 of the Company Law are not exclusive and
clarify additional factors that courts may consider when adjudicating such
cases.2' Doing so will provide greater clarity to judges, shareholders, investors,
and creditors about how the legal analysis should proceed in a veil-piercing
case.
Delineating a multifactor list is common in other jurisdictions. U.S. courts
commonly rely upon a set of eleven factors outlined by Frederick Powell in the
1930s." More recent commentators have suggested as many as thirty-one
factors that should be taken into account.27 German courts have also adopted a
set of factors similar to those used by U.S. courts, including commingling of
assets, failure to follow formalities, undercapitalization of assets, and the extent
24. Some Chinese scholars have also called for such a clarification. See, e.g., Zhu Yunfang, Jiekai
gongsi de miansha: Gudong chengdan liandai zeren de goucheng yaojian [Piercing the Corporate
Veil: Essential Elements of Shareholders' Joint Liability], 20 J. JINLING INST. TECH. 29, 31
(2006).
25. A small number of Chinese scholars themselves have debated the utility of delineating a list
of factors that should be considered in a veil-piercing case. Compare Zhu Yunfang, supra
note 24 (stressing the need to explain five sets of factors in a judicial interpretation) with Xu
Qiong, Jiekai gongsi rengefouren lilun de miansha [Uncovering the Veil of the Theory Behind
Disregarding the Corporate Entity], 8 J. UNIv. ECON. Sci. TECH. CHINA (Soc. Sci. ED.) 83, 84-
85 (20o6) (arguing that multifactor approaches are inherently vague and problematic).
z6. FREDERICKJ. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 (1931).
27. Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55
DENV. L.J. 1, 52-55 (1978).
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to which one company dominates another.2 Japanese lower courts have also
constructed a similar list of factors for deciding veil-piercing cases. 9
Among the factors30 that Chinese courts should analyze in any veil-piercing
case are:
(i) Whether the company is undercapitalized, which was a major
factor in cases prior to the 2006 Company Law. 1  An
undercapitalization analysis should also include whether creditors
were intentionally misled about the financial strength of the
corporation.
(2) Whether the corporation failed to observe corporate formalities,
such as holding separate board meetings, keeping separate
records, maintaining separate offices and accounts, filing separate
tax returns, and holding separate deeds to property.
(3) Whether corporate assets were diverted for personal use.3 Such
diversion, if it occurs without payment or prior agreement, is often
evidence of an alter-ego relationship between the shareholder and
the corporation.
(4) Whether the corporation failed to issue any stock, maintain real
property, buy separate insurance, or engage in other conduct
typical of a normal corporation.
28. PRESSER, supra note 2o, § 5:5.
29. Id. § 5.6 (noting that such factors include the commingling of assets, repeated overlap of
business transactions or activities, failure to follow corporate formalities, inadequate
capitalization, and lack of a separate identity between corporation and individual).
3o. Note that this is a suggestive, rather than an exhaustive, list. These factors are among those
most commonly considered by courts in other jurisdictions, and in some instances, involve a
combination of factors that are separately delineated. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 4.3, at 156-61 (2002); JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 7.08, at 28o-81 (2d ed. 2003). U.S. cases that
have applied a multifactor balancing test include DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray
Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Bach, 567 P.2d
1337, 1341-42 (Kan. 1977); and Attorney General v. M.C.K., Inc., 736 N.E.2d 373, 380 n.19
(Mass. 2000).
31. A number of Chinese scholars have emphasized the importance of this factor. See, e.g., Liu
Jun-hai, supra note 21, at 115-16; Liu Li, Jiekai gongsi de miansha: Gongsi faren renge fouren
zhidu de shiyong [Piercing the Corporate Veil: On the Application of Disregarding the Corporate
Entity], 23 J. HUBEI INST. EDUC. 83, 85 (2006); Zhu Yunfang, supra note 24, at 31; Zhu
Ciyun, supra note 16, at 2-3.
32. Some Chinese courts and scholars have stressed the importance of this factor. See, e.g.,
Beijing Chengxiang Haodu Constr. Co. v. Yang Jingui, CHINALAWINFO (Beijing High
People's Ct., July 31, 2002); Zhu Ciyun, supra note 16.
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(5) Whether the parent company interfered excessively in the
management of the subsidiary.
(6) Whether the parent and subsidiary companies conducted joint
activities, such as purchasing, advertising, or public relations, and
if so, whether payment for such activities was unfairly distributed
across the two companies.
(7) Whether the corporation concealed or misrepresented the
responsible ownership, management, or financial interests in the
corporation, or concealed the personal business interests of the
shareholders.
(8) Whether the corporation failed to pay or overpaid dividends to
shareholders.33
Should China proceed down such a path, it ought to stipulate how courts
are to balance the various factors considered in their analysis. Given the rapidly
evolving transformation of its market economy, China would be best served by
a "totality of the circumstances" test. The totality of the circumstances test
requires courts to consider the overall context under which the alleged
suspicious or fraudulent corporate activity occurred, in addition to the specific
factors. Not every prong of the multifactor test need be present, but the more
that are, the more likely it is that a court will pierce the corporate veil. This test
has been used by some American courts under the guise of an equity theory,
3 4
and evolved from criticisms that previous theories of veil piercing applied by
courts were "[i]n practice ... virtually indistinguishable from one another."3
Applying a multifactor analysis and test would offer both greater certainty
about the legal test in veil-piercing cases and greater flexibility for courts to
consider the individual factual circumstances of each case.
Finally, the SPC or State Council should clarify the applicable scope of the
veil-piercing provisions of the new Company Law. China should clarify that
the provisions apply in noncreditor contexts. Other jurisdictions have applied
the doctrine more broadly. For example, in the United States, if the corporate
form has been abused and the assets of the tortfeasor are insufficient, courts
33. Chinese scholars have disagreed about this factor's relevance. Compare Liu Li, supra note 31,
at 8s (emphazing its importance), with Xu Q ong, supra note 25, at 84 (discounting its
importance).
34. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, 54o F.2d 681; White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584
S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
35. Cox & HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.08, at 279.
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will mandate that a parent company compensate tort victims., 6 U.S. courts
have also created an exception for public policy,37 which courts have applied in
antitrust cases to strike down "shell companies" established to circumvent
antitrust laws. 38 Similarly, Japanese courts have allowed veil piercing in
contexts such as violations of noncompetition agreements and unfair labor
practices.39 Chinese judges, shareholders, investors, and potential noncreditor
plaintiffs alike would benefit from knowing under exactly what circumstances
Chinese courts can disregard the corporate form.
CONCLUSION
Formally recognizing veil piercing ends more than a decade of uncertainty
over whether Chinese judges can pierce corporate veils. However, the new law
is incomplete and introduces new problems. To correct these problems, the
SPC or the State Council should issue additional directives to clarify China's
veil-piercing doctrine. Specifically, directives should address the set of factors
that courts may consider in veil-piercing cases and how these factors should be
balanced in a "totality of the circumstances" test. In addition, China should
consider expanding veil piercing to antitrust and other contexts. Doing so
would bring China's veil-piercing doctrine more in line with international
practice.
MARK WU
36. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1O58-59, lO68-70 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Love v. State, 972 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App. 1998) (piercing the corporate veil because
using limited corporate liability to avoid pollution statutes is contrary to public policy).
38. See, e.g., Zale Corp. v. FTC, 473 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 11o (D. Vt. 1973).
39. Hiroyuki Tezuka, Piercing Corporate Structures in Japan 1995 ABA.-I.P.B.A. DiSp. RESOL.
PAC. RIM 4,12.
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